Key Islamic Political Thinkers offers an examination of some of the leading intellectuals behind the resurgence of political Islam. The essays in this volume cover a selection of thinkers that is representative of the main strands of contemporary Muslim political thought.

A concise and authoritative introduction to Islamic political ideas In sixteen concise chapters on key topics, this book provides a rich, authoritative, and up-to-date introduction to Islamic political thought from the birth of Islam to today, presenting essential background and context for understanding contemporary politics in the Islamic world and beyond. Selected from the acclaimed Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought, and focusing on the origins, development, and contemporary importance of Islamic political ideas and related subjects, each chapter offers a (...) sophisticated yet accessible introduction to its topic. Written by leading specialists and incorporating the latest scholarship, the alphabetically arranged chapters cover the topics of authority, the caliphate, fundamentalism, government, jihad, knowledge, minorities, modernity, Muhammad, pluralism and tolerance, the Qur'an, revival and reform, shariʿa (sacred law), traditional political thought, ‘ulama' (religious scholars), and women. Read separately or together, these chapters provide an indispensable resource for students, journalists, policymakers, and anyone else seeking an informed perspective on the complex intersection of Islam and politics. The contributors are Gerhard Bowering, Ayesha S. Chaudhry, Patricia Crone, Roxanne Euben, Yohanan Friedmann, Paul L. Heck, Roy Jackson, Wadad Kadi, John Kelsay, Gudrun Krämer, Ebrahim Moosa, Armando Salvatore, Aram A. Shahin, Emad El-Din Shahin, Devin J. Stewart, SherAli Tareen, and Muhammad Qasim Zaman. A new afterword discusses the essays in relation to contemporary political developments. (shrink)

Artifacts are ubiquitous and influential in our world, but their nature and existence are controversial. Several theories have been proposed to explain the ontology of artifacts. Drawing on Popper's theory of three worlds, this paper suggests a metaphysics for artifacts along the line of a critical rationalist (CR) approach. This theory distinguishes between three realms of reality: the physical world (World 1), the mental world (World 2), and the world of objective knowledge (World 3). The paper argues that artifacts have (...) different ontological components that correspond to these three realms, and that each component is real and causal. The paper shows how this perspective can account for the intentional and functional aspects of artifacts, as well as their dependence on plans that influence different realms of reality. The paper explains how this pluralistic ontology, compared to the rival theories, enables one to explain the relevant ontological problems of artifacts. The paper also explores how this proposal can lead to a research program encompassing a broader range of technologies, such as social artifacts. In sum, the paper suggests that Popper's three worlds theory provides a rich and comprehensive framework for understanding the metaphysics of artifacts. (shrink)

Laws can be evaluated as better or worse relative to different normative standards. But the standard set by the Rule of Law defines a kind-relative standard of evaluation: features like generality, publicity, and non-retroactivity make the law better as law. This fact about legal evaluation invites a comparison between law and other “goodness-fixing kinds,” where a kind is goodness-fixing if what it is to be a member of the kind fixes a standard for evaluating instances as better or worse. Indeed, (...) for any goodness-fixing kind, K, that sets a standard, S, for evaluating Ks as Ks, we can ask: (1) How does the nature of Ks explain S? (2) Does being a K depend on meeting a minimum threshold of S-relative goodness? In the case of law and its kind-relative standard defined by the Rule-of-Law virtues, these questions lack settled answers. Although Raz (1979, 2019) offers some discussion, I argue that his answers have the surprising upshot of rendering law sui generis relative to other goodness-fixing kinds, and that preserving continuity with other such kinds involves revising the general picture. On the revised picture, law construed as a system of rules is subject to kind-relative evaluation because it is (a) a functional artifact, (b) with an essential function of realizing a limited normative ideal, and (c) its being minimally good at that function—that is, its realization of the relevant normative ideal to some degree—is a condition and ground of law’s existence, since all functional artifacts appear to be subject to such threshold conditions. (shrink)

Using intelligent software agents in the world of e-commerce may give rise to many difficulties especially with regard to the validity of agent-based contracts and the attribution of liability for the actions of such agents. This paper thus critically examines the main approaches that have been advanced to deal with software agents, and proposes the gradual approach as a way of overcoming the difficulties of such agents by adopting different standards of responsibility depending whether the action is done autonomously by (...) an unattended software, or whether it is done automatically by an attended software. Throughout this paper, it is argued that the introduction of “one size” regulation without sufficient consideration of the nature of software agents or the environments in which they communicate might lead to a divorce between the legal theory and technological practice. It is also concluded that it is incorrect to deal with software agents as if they were either legal persons or nothing without in any way accounting for the fact that there are various kinds of such agents endowed with different levels of autonomy, mobility, intelligence, and sophistication. However, this paper is not intended to provide the final answer to all problematic questions posed by the emergence of intelligent software agents, but is designed to provide some kind of temporary relief until such agents reach a more reliable and autonomous level whereby law begins to regard them, rather than their users, as the source of the relevant action. (shrink)

Virtually all philosophers of science have construed fundamental theories as descriptions of entities, properties, and/or structures. Call this the “descriptive-ontological” view. I argue that this view is incorrect, at least insofar as physical theories are concerned. I propose a novel construal of theories that I call the “prescriptive-dynamical” view. The central tenet of this view, roughly put, is that the _essential_ content of fundamental physical theories is a _prescription for interfacing with natural systems and translating local data into compact theoretical (...) language_. The descriptive-ontological aspects of theories, if any, are taken as _inessential_ content on this view: they do not contribute to the predictive success of the theory. Rather than describing _what is there_, the essence of a physical theory is to tell us _what to do_ when interfacing with a physical system. (shrink)

The kind of empathy that is communicated through expressions like “I feel your pain” or “I share your sadness” is important, but peculiar. For it seems to require something perplexing and elusive: sharing another’s experience. It’s not clear how this is possible. We each experience the world from our own point of view, which no one else occupies. It’s also unclear exactly why it is so important that we share others' pains. If you are in pain, then why should it (...) matter, and be a good thing, that I am also in the same pain? Our goal in this paper is to address these questions. Specifically, our goal is to clarify how empathy, in the regimented sense of sharing another’s pain, is possible and why it is important. Central to our account is the concept of being acquainted with—that is, directly aware of—pain. When I feel my own pain, and am acquainted with it, I want the pain to stop, and I’m moved—sometimes compelled—to stop it. My acquaintance with the pain is what reveals that it is no good, to be gotten rid of, and to be avoided in the future. Acquaintance also appears to be implicated in our understanding of, and motivation to relieve, others’ pains. When I say “I feel your pain” I express an awareness of your pain, a direct appreciation of its noxious qualities, and, as with my own pain, an understanding of why it ought to be eased. Explaining how empathy is both possible and important therefore involves clarifying the nature of acquaintance: its limits, epistemic role, and motivational significance. What our analysis reveals is that agents have both epistemic and moral reasons to share other people’s pain because pain-sharing is the source of a species of character-building knowledge that we have no other way of accessing except through direct acquaintance with pain. (shrink)

One of the main objections to life extension is that life extension will cause severe overpopulation. This objection presents both moral and demographic issues. To explore the demographic issue, we present an updated and improved version of the formula in chapter six of _New Methuselahs_ for projecting the demographic impact of life extension. The new version includes additional demographical factors such as non-aging related causes of death. According to projections generated with this revised formula, moderate life extension (a life expectancy (...) of 120 years) will not significantly increase population at the fertility rates current in the developed world, but radical life expectancy (halting aging completely, leading to an average life expectancy of 1000 years) can lead to severe overpopulation even at very low fertility rates. This formula also enables us to ascertain what fertility rate and birth spacing will prevent life extension from causing severe overpopulation. The moral issues arise if radical life extension causes overpopulation severe enough to outweigh the benefits it brings. _New Methuselahs_ proposed a reproductive policy for avoiding severe overpopulation by limiting reproduction for those who use life extension. We then consider a moral objection to this policy that was not discussed in _New Methuselahs_: it is not likely that society will succeed in imposing limits to reproduction, therefore, it is likely that radical life extension is morally wrong. We respond to this objection and defend our response against two further objections. (shrink)

Purpose Responsible research and innovation is taking a role in assisting all types of stakeholders, including industry members, in moving their research and innovation initiatives to tackle grand challenges. The literature on RRI, however, focuses little on how industry can implement RRI principles. To solve this gap, the purpose of this study is to construct a conceptual framework for managing and assessing RRI principles in the industry. Design/methodology/approach Qualitative research was used to build the RRI key performance indicator list; 30 (...) interviews were conducted to design a framework which was pilot tested in a company to identify how to align technology outcomes to the values, needs and expectations of the society. Findings This study depicts five successive RRI implementation levels and exhibits RRI key performance indicators. Drawing on extant models, this study develops RRI levels and indicators to discuss why industry should become engaged in RRI, how it can embed RRI principles into R&I processes and how RRI indicators can be managed systematically. Originality/value The connection between RRI key performance indicators and RRI levels determines how industry can integrate principles and methodologies of RRI into R&I processes. The model in the study shows how companies move from one RRI stage to another and this study aims to exhibit an ideal stage of RRI for industry. (shrink)

The fallacy of premature designations such as “Iran's Twitter Revolution” can be attributed to the empirical gap in our knowledge about such sociotechnical phenomena in non-Western societies. To fill this gap, we need in-depth analyses of social media use in those contexts and to create detailed maps of online public environments in such societies. This paper aims to present such cartography of the political landscape of Persian Twitter by studying the case of Iran's 2013 presidential election. The objective of this (...) study is twofold: first, to fill the empirical gap in our knowledge about Twitter use in Iran, and second, to develop computational methods for studying Persian Twitter and identify the best methods for addressing different issues. During Iran's 2013 presidential election, three million tweets were collected and analyzed using social network analysis and machine learning. The findings provide a more nuanced view of the political landscape of Persian Twitter and identify patterns in accordance with or in contrast to those identified in the English-speaking Twittersphere around the 2013 presidential election. Persian Twitter was dominated by micro-celebrities, whereas institutional elites dominated English discourse about Iran on Twitter. The results also illustrate that Persian Twitter in 2013 was predominantly in favor of reformists. Finally, this study demonstrates that sentiment analysis toward political name entities can be used efficiently for mapping the political landscape of conversation on Twitter. (shrink)

The notion of 'freedom' has gained an emblematic character in contemporary political discourse. It is, commonly, viewed as the central value and political goal of modern societies. Similarly, human rights documents conceive of freedom as their founding principle with universal validity. In contradistinction to this prevalent approach to freedom, this paper aims to demonstrate that freedom is, primarily, a political signifier with social-historical variability. One cannot, therefore, simply and uncritically assume that freedom has (or should have) universal validity or transhistorical (...) significance. In the first section of this paper, the structure of the contemporary liberal discourse on freedom is discussed and called into question. In light of Arendt's interpretation of freedom and through her analysis of the public domain, I reflect on the social-historical variability of the meaning of freedom and its inextricable nexus with a particular form of society. In the second section and drawing on Castoriadis, the notion of 'freedom' is approached in view of human signifying practices and imaginary dimension of society. This examination reveals in what way freedom––in the sense of a central social imaginary signification––contributes to the institution of an autonomous mode of society and determines the affective disposition and intentional vector of its inhabitants. (shrink)

The central motivation behind the scientific realism debate is explaining the impressive success of scientific theories. The debate has been dominated by two rival types of explanations: the first relies on some sort of static, referentially transparent relationship between the theory and the unobservable world, such as truthlikeness, representation, or structural similarity; the second relies on no robust relationship between the theory and unobservable reality at all, and instead draws on predictive similarity and the stringent methodology of science to explain (...) success. I argue that this is a false dichotomy, at least insofar as dynamical theories are concerned. The best explanation of the success of dynamical theories, I argue, must appeal to a robust but referentially opaque theory–world relation. The dynamical notion of ‘tracking’ fulfills this promise. I formulate a modified no miracles argument that is liberated from the false dichotomy and show how tracking responds to the modified argument. (shrink)

The Correspondence Principle of old quantum theory is commonly considered to be the requirement that quantum and classical theories converge in their empirical predictions in the appropriate asymptotic limit. That perception has persisted despite the fact that Bohr and other early proponents of CP clearly did not intend it as a mere requirement, and despite much recent historical work. In this paper, I build on this work by first giving an explicit formulation to the mentioned asymptotic requirement ) and then (...) discussing various possible formulations of CP for emission on the basis of the primary literature as well as general physical and metaphysical considerations. I shall then show that, in all of the most probable interpretations of CP that consider quantum theory as a universal theory, any system incorporating both CR and CP for emission would in fact be inconsistent. Old quantum theory measurably contradicts classical physics in the classical regime. (shrink)

As with terms such as “human rights”, “democracy”, and “equality”, the notion of “freedom” has an emblematic character with highly normative overtones. After the declaration of universal human rights, one might argue that freedom is – at least formally – a universal entitlement belonging to every human being. However, this universalist structure is built upon a conflictual foundation, as the juridico-political meaning of freedom is determined by the boundaries of national citizenship, statehood, and territorial sovereignty. This chapter examines refugeehood as (...) a normal by-product of the post-colonial world order, embodying the counter-history of nation-states whose internal borders, walls, and external fortifications are growingly being militarised and reinforced. Refugeehood represents an anomalous juridico-political condition that cannot be elucidated by colonial-racial binaries such as inclusion versus exclusion or rightlessness versus national citizenship. The central idea of this chapter is that, for refugees, the meaning of freedom and unfreedom are intertwined and should be approached as a dynamic relationship characterising the state of (non)-subjectivity. As political (non)-subjects, refugees call structural determinations of unfreedom into question. Refugees’ freedom is expressed in the act of flight and border crossing, irregular migratory movement, language games of resistance, and other emancipatory signifying practices by which they claim a place of refuge in the world. (shrink)

Problems with regard to the analysis of argumentative partly discourse arise from definitorial disconformity. In this article, Informal argument is taken as the primary definition to study the basic structure of argument from a fragment of an Agatha Christie novel. Bilmes' account of the notions of Formulation (F) and Decision (D+/D-) are adapted to describe the relations of opposition which are displayed in informal argument. The minimal structure of argument is represented by the formula F/D-/D-, in which F is a (...) speaker's personal composition of a ‘fact’, the first D- is the disconfirming uptake of it by another speaker and the second D- is the completing disconfirming uptake by the initial speaker. Some of the speaker's possibilities to initiate an argument by expressing a Formulation are explored, as well as the social and cultural norms which play a role in argument-initiation and the concepts of ‘win’ and ‘loss’. (shrink)

This is a compilation of papers presented at the Seventeenth Annual Meeting of the West Coast Conference on Formal Linguistics, held February 20-22, 1998 in Vancouver, Canada, hosted by the University of British Columbia Department of Linguistics. The conference drew a large number of participants, from around the world. The fifty papers in this volume address theoretical issues in Syntax, Phonology, the Syntax-Semantics and Syntax-Phonology interfaces, and Language Acquisition, and provide an exciting view of current theory in these areas.

Nuclear pore complexes mediate and control transport between the cytosol and the nucleus. They form a highly selective and, thus, tight nuclear barrier between these compartments. The nuclear barrier provides the cell with the opportunity to control access to its DNA, a defining feature of eukaryotes. The tightness of the nuclear barrier is therefore physiologically pivotal and any remarkable change in its structure and permeability can prove pathophysiological, e.g. as a result of viral attack. However, there is accumulating evidence that (...) nuclear barrier structure and permeability are highly responsive to hydrophobic cargos of crucial physiological and therapeutic relevance, glucocorticoids (steroid hormones). The present review highlights the glucocorticoid‐induced effects on the nuclear barrier structure and permeability concluding that they are physiologically essential to mediate glucocorticoid action. BioEssays 28: 935–942, 2006. © 2006 Wiley periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Taking perceptual experience to consist in a relation of acquaintance with the sensible qualities, I argue that the state of being acquainted with a sensible quality is intrinsically a form of knowledge, and not merely a means to more familiar kinds of knowledge, such as propositional or dispositional knowledge. We should accept the epistemic claim for its explanatory power and theoretical usefulness. That acquaintance is knowledge best explains the intuitive epistemic appeal of ‘Edenic’ counterfactuals involving unmediated perceptual contact with reality (...) (cf. Chalmers, in: Gendler, Hawthorne (eds) Perceptual experience, Oxford University Press, 2006). It explains the elusiveness of knowledge gained through new acquaintances. It coheres with the knowledge-like functional role of acquaintance in the special context of evaluative beliefs and evaluative reasoning, where the objects of acquaintance serve as evidence and inferential basis. And, finally, taking acquaintance to be knowledge is theoretically fruitful: it helps vindicate claims about the relationship between knowledge and concern for others we already find intuitive or outright accept. After developing a novel case for the epistemic claim, I respond to two familiar objections against it: namely, (1) that there are no pre-propositional, pre-conceptual cases of perceptual experience that remain epistemically relevant (Sellars in Empiricism and the philosophy of mind, Routledge, 1968, McDowell, in: Lindgard (ed) John McDowell: Experience, norm, and nature, Blackwell, 2008); and (2) that the category of knowledge appears gerrymandered once we add ‘object’ knowledge to the epistemological mix (Farkas, in: Knowles, Raleigh (eds), Acquaintance: new essays, Oxford University Press, 2019). (shrink)

Legal anti-positivism is widely believed to be a general theory of law that generates far too many false negatives. If anti-positivism is true, certain rules bearing all the hallmarks of legality are not in fact legal. This impression, fostered by both positivists and anti-positivists, stems from an overly narrow conception of the kinds of moral facts that ground legal facts: roughly, facts about what is morally optimific—morally best or morally justified or morally obligatory given our social practices. A less restrictive (...) view of the kinds of moral properties that ground legality results in a form of anti-positivism that can accommodate any legal rule consistent with positivism, including the alleged counter-examples. This form of “inclusive” anti-positivism is not just invulnerable to extensional challenges from the positivist. It is the only account that withstands extensional objections, while incorporating, on purely conceptual grounds, a large part of the content of morality into law. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The ethical review process is an important component of contemporary health research worldwide. Sudan started an ethical review process rather late in comparison with other countries. In this study, we evaluate the structure and functions of existing ethics review committees. We also explore the knowledge and attitudes of Sudanese researchers toward the ethical review process and their experience with existing ethics review committees. There are four ethics review committees in the country; these committees have no institutional regulations to govern (...) their functions. Furthermore, Sudan also lacks national guidelines. Ethical reviews are carried out primarily for studies seeking international funding and are almost always governed by the funding agencies’ requirements. Nearly half of respondents (46.3%) knew about the existence of research ethics committees in Sudan. Researchers reported a variety of experiences with the ethical review process; most of them were unable to define ‘ethics committee’. (shrink)

Sentencing outcomes turn on moral and evaluative determinations. For example, a finding of “irreparable corruption” is generally a precondition for juvenile life without parole. A finding that the “aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors” determines whether a defendant receives the death penalty. Should such moral determinations that expose defendants to extraordinary penalties be subject to a standard of proof? A broad range of federal and state courts have purported to decide this issue “in the abstract and without reference to our (...) sentencing case law,” as the Supreme Court recently put it. Kansas v. Carr, 577 U.S. 108, 119 (2016). According to these courts, “it would mean nothing” to ask whether the defendant “deserves mercy beyond a reasonable doubt” or “more-likely-than-not deserves it” because moral questions are not “factual.” Instead, moral determinations are highly subjective “value calls” to which concepts of doubt and certainty do not intelligibly apply. -/- Implicit in these rulings is a controversial view of the nature of moral judgment. This Article traces the contours of the view and argues that it is out of step with the way the broader public thinks about morality and fails to address the issues defendants have raised. Courts should avoid wading into such controversial waters for two reasons. First, the judiciary has historically maintained neutrality on issues of significant public concern. Second, even if moral determinations are not factual, applying a standard of proof to at least some moral decisions at sentencing would change the outcome of the sentencer’s deliberations, and improve the legitimacy of the legal system. For the reasonableness of doubt depends on context; and moral questions—"are you certain the defendant deserves death?”—make salient the stakes relative to which a person should decide what to believe about ordinary empirical matters. On the resulting view, reasonable doubt in the final moral analysis is not just intelligible, but essential for correcting a bias in the structure of the bifurcated criminal trial that systematically disadvantages defendants: the tendency for de-contextualized "factual findings” in the guilt phase to control outcomes at sentencing. (shrink)

Expressivists traditionally explain normative supervenience by saying it is a conceptual truth. I argue against this tradition in two steps. First, I show the modal claim that stands in need of explanation has been stated imprecisely. Classic arguments in metaethics for normative supervenience and those that rely on it as a premise presuppose a constraint on the supervenience base that is rarely (if ever) made explicit: the repeatability of the non-normative properties on which the normative supervenes. Non-normative properties are repeatable (...) when it is possible for numerically distinct individuals to share them. Second, I show if the modal truth that stands in need of explanation entails that there are individuals exactly alike in repeatable non-normative respects that cannot normatively differ, then standard expressivist accounts of normative supervenience as a conceptual truth are unsuccessful. Expressivist metasemantics for normative terms, together with constitutive facts about the non-cognitive attitudes essentially involved in normative thought, strongly suggest that repeatable supervenience could not be a conceptual truth. I argue, finally, that although repeatable supervenience bears the marks of a conceptual truth, expressivists should be content to treat it as an ordinary normative truth, and to explain it the same way they explain other normative truths. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Demosthenes, Aristoteles und Pausanias berichten von dem Dikasterion in Phreatto, zu dem ein außer Landes gegangener Athener auf einem Boot heranfährt, dieses unmittelbar an der Küste festmacht und sich dann in einem Prozess verteidigt. Er betritt zu keinem Zeitpunkt athenischen Boden, sondern bleibt auf dem Boot und vernimmt dort das Urteil, ob er vorsätzlich getötet hat oder nicht. Diese Verhandlungsform zwischen Land und Meer kann – so aufwendig und eigentümlich sie auch anmutet – durchaus historisch sein, ist aber nur (...) zu begreifen, wenn man von Drakons Gesetz über die Tötung ausgeht. Der Gesetzgeber hat 621/620 v. Chr. den Vollzug der Blutrache unter die Kontrolle der athenischen Gemeinschaft gestellt und damit einen wichtigen Schritt zur Eindämmung von Konflikten in der Polis geleistet. Das Verfahren in Phreatto ist im Kontext dieser Verordnung zu betrachten. (shrink)

This article presents the edition of a late 3rd/9th- or early 4th/10th-century search warrant for stolen goods (P.Cair.EgLib.inv. 536v). The scribe reports that two black men (aswadayn) were traveling on two donkeys, one of which was also loaded with a saddlebag of money, jewellery and clothes. Upon reaching the Upper Egyptian village of Saqāwa, the two black men were assaulted and murdered, and the goods and donkeys stolen. This document corroborates descriptions in historical works of frequent rebel attacks in various (...) regions of Egypt in the 3rd/9th and 4rd/10th centuries. (shrink)

One of the most significant philosophical works of the twentieth century, _Contributions to Philosophy_ is also one of the most difficult. Parvis Emad, in this collection of interpretive and critical essays, unravels and clarifies this challenging work with a rare depth and originality. In addition to grappling with other commentaries on Heidegger, he highlights Heidegger's "being-historical thinking" as thinking that sheds new light on theological, technological, and scientific interpretations of reality. At the crux of Emad's interpretation is his (...) elucidation of the issue of "the turning" in Heidegger's thought and his "enactment" of Heidegger's thinking. He finds that only when Heidegger's work is enacted is his thinking truly revealed. (shrink)

Legal positivists maintain that the legality of a rule is fundamentally determined by social facts. Yet for much of legal history, ordinary officials used legal terminology in ways that seem inconsistent with positivism. Judges regularly cited, analyzed, and predicated their decisions on the ‘laws of justice’ which they claimed had universal legal import. This practice, though well-documented by historians, has received surprisingly little philosophical attention; I argue that it invites explanation from positivists. After taxonomizing the positivist’s explanatory options, I suggest (...) that the most viable option appeals to conceptual change: classical Romans, early modern Europeans, founding-era Americans were not using ‘law’ (or ‘lex’ or ‘jus’) to refer to the subject matter of contemporary legal philosophy. But the strategy is costly. It renders positivism’s truth surprisingly parochial. And it supplies new reasons for doubting positivist accounts of contemporary practices, including the treatment of moral principles in modern adjudication. (shrink)

The metaethical subjectivist claims that there is nothing more to a moral disagreement than a conflict in the desires of the parties involved. Recently, David Enoch has argued that metaethical subjectivism has unacceptable ethical implications. If the subjectivist is right about moral disagreement, then it follows, according to Enoch, that we cannot stand our ground in moral disagreements without violating the demands of impartiality. For being impartial, we’re told, involves being willing to compromise in conflicts that are merely due to (...) competing desires—the parties to such conflicts should decide what to do on the basis of a coin flip. I suggest that Enoch is mistaken in his conception of what it means to be impartial. Once impartiality is properly construed, standing one’s ground in desire-based conflicts, whether or not moral values are at stake in the conflict, is consistent with being impartial. I defend a view on which impartiality can be understood in terms of features of our desiring attitudes. An agent acts impartially in desire-based conflicts whenever she is motivated by a final desire that aims at promoting the wellbeing of persons in a way that is insensitive to the identities of persons and their morally arbitrary features like their gender or skin color. Based on the account, I explain where Enoch’s discussion of the argument goes wrong, as well as why responses to the argument from Enoch’s critics have so far missed the mark. (shrink)

https://revistes.uab.cat/enrahonar/article/view/v34-emad.

"[Heidegger's] greatest work... essential for all collections." —Choice "... students of Heidegger will surely find this book indispensable." —Library Journal Contributions to Philosophy, written in 1936-38 and first published in 1989 as Beiträge zur Philosophie, is Heidegger’s most ground-breaking work after the publication of Being and Time in 1927. If Being and Time is perceived as undermining modern metaphysics, Contributions undertakes to reshape the very project of thinking.

The question of liability in the case of using intelligent agents is far from simple, and cannot sufficiently be answered by deeming the human user as being automatically responsible for all actions and mistakes of his agent. Therefore, this paper is specifically concerned with the significant difficulties which might arise in this regard especially if the technology behind software agents evolves, or is commonly used on a larger scale. Furthermore, this paper contemplates whether or not it is possible to share (...) the responsibility with these agents and what are the main objections surrounding the assumption of considering such agents as responsible entities. This paper, however, is not intended to provide the final answer to all questions and challenges in this regard, but to identify the main components, and provide some perspectives on how to deal with such issue. (shrink)

According to Fine (among others), a nonbasic factual proposition must be grounded in facts involving those of its constituents that are both real and fundamental. But the principle is vulnerable to several dialectically significant counterexamples. It entails, for example, that a logical Platonist cannot accept that true disjunctions are grounded in the truth of their disjuncts; that a Platonist about mathematical objects cannot accept that sets are grounded in their members; and that a color primitivist cannot accept that an object’s (...) being scarlet grounds its not being chartreuse. The Finean might try to defend these implications, but it generates further problems. Instead, the principle should be rejected. An important upshot is that the principle cannot be relied on, as it has been, to distinguish robust realists from anti-realists about a propositional domain—the principle obscures ways of taking features to be both real and fundamental. (shrink)

This study examines the effects of teaching philosophy for children (P4C) on the development of non-cognitive skills among students. Although the main focus of modern schooling is on attainment, non-cognitive skills and attitudes are still within the scope of modern education. The Ministry of Education in Saudi Arabia introduced a new policy to teach critical thinking and philosophy in its public schools in 2017. Although the effects of teaching philosophy on cognitive skills have been well-researched, fewer studies have studied the (...) effects the teaching philosophy has on non-cognitive skills. The current study is the first to explore this issue in the Saudi educational context. This paper presents findings from a quasi-experiential design using 28 students in a Saudi elementary public school. An experimental group of sixth-graders participated in Philosophy for Children (P4C) sessions for 3 months, while the other group of sixth-graders did not receive any philosophy-related training. To collect data, the researchers used a survey designed for non-cognitive outcomes. The results show that the P4C group ranked higher in measures of communication, sociability, self-confidence, determination, willingness to try new things, happiness, and solving problems. On the other hand, the results show that the P4C group lagged behind in terms of empathy, democracy, and diversity compared to the experimental group. However, the differences are minor, and the sample is small. Nonetheless, the results are promising in indicating that P4C can improve students’ non-cognitive skills. (shrink)

This paper has two closely related objectives. (a) Relying on the most recent studies devoted to the question of Heidegger and translation, this paper takes a closer look at this question by examining the comments Heidegger made on the issue of translation in the course of a seminar he gave in 1951 at Cérisy-la-Salle. (b) Drawing upon the concept of a productive translation that Heidegger puts forth in that seminar, and distinguishing a being-historical (seinsgeschichtliche) work from a historical presentation (historische (...) Darstellung) the paper at the end attempts a critical assessment of the English translation of Heidegger’s Nietzsche. (shrink)

The current study investigated correlations among gifted students’ academic performance; emotional, social, analytical, creative, and practical intelligence; and their implicit theories of intelligence. Furthermore, it studied the effect of gender and grade on these variables. The participants included 174 gifted fifth and sixth grade students, comprising 53.4% male and 46.6% female. The following analytical, creative, and practical intelligence tests were administered: Aurora Battery, the emotional intelligence scale, the implicit theories of intelligence scale, and an assessment scale of students’ performances. The (...) results revealed significant correlations among academic performance, kinds of intelligence, and implicit theories of intelligence. There were no significant differences between the male and female students in these measures. There were, however, significant differences between the fifth and sixth grade students, with the sixth-grade students showing higher levels of all kinds of intelligence, except emotional intelligence. Moreover, the results indicated that the intelligence measures were non-significantly affected by either gender or gender–grade interaction. Overall, our results showed that most types of intelligence are related to giftedness, and that there were no gender differences among gifted students on measures of intelligence. (shrink)

This paper attempts to elucidate the exceptional stance Heidegger takes in Beiträge toward Hölderlin’s “poetizing.” On the one hand, Beiträge provides no specific guideline for understanding this exceptional stance. On the other hand, the text of a “Dialogue” Heidegger wrote almost a decade after Beiträge, providesthe hermeneutic guideline needed for understanding Heidegger’s exceptional position on this poet. This hermeneutic guideline is none other than what Heidegger calls the “Will.” Following this guideline, the paper proceeds to highlight the hermeneutic thesis according (...) to which another appearing of being (Sein)—one not referentially dependent upon the “Will”—is sheltered and preserved in Hölderlin’s “poetizing.” Elucidating this thesis the paper concludes that Hölderlin’s“poetizing” unfolds from within the Other Onset (der andere Anfang) of thinking. (shrink)